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This paper studies the structure of qualitative capacities, that is, monotonic set-functions,
when they range on a finite totally ordered scale equipped with an order-reversing 
map. These set-functions correspond to general representations of uncertainty, as well as 
importance levels of groups of criteria in multiple-criteria decision-making. We show that 
any capacity or fuzzy measure ranging on a qualitative scale can be viewed both as the 
lower bound of a set of possibility measures and the upper bound of a set of necessity 
measures (a situation somewhat similar to the one of quantitative capacities with respect 
to imprecise probability theory). We show that any capacity is characterized by a non-
empty class of possibility measures having the structure of an upper semi-lattice. The 
lower bounds of this class are enough to reconstruct the capacity, and the number of 
them is characteristic of its complexity. An algorithm is provided to compute the minimal 
set of possibility measures dominating a given capacity. This algorithm relies on the 
representation of the capacity by means of its qualitative Möbius transform, and the use of 
selection functions of the corresponding focal sets. We provide the connection between 
Sugeno integrals and lower possibility measures. We introduce a sequence of axioms 
generalizing the maxitivity property of possibility measures, and related to the number 
of possibility measures needed for this reconstruction. In the Boolean case, capacities 
are closely related to non-regular modal logics and their neighborhood semantics can be 
described in terms of qualitative Möbius transforms.
1. Introduction
A fuzzy measure [38] (or a capacity [10]) is a set-function that is monotonic under inclusion. In this paper, the capacity 
is said to be qualitative (or q-capacity, for short) if its range is a finite totally ordered set. It means we do not presuppose 
addition is available in the capacity range, only minimum and maximum. In such a context the connection with probability 
measures is lost. Consequently a number of notions, meaningful in the numerical setting, are lost as well, such as the Möbius 
transform [34], the conjugate, supermodularity [10] and the like. Likewise, some numerical capacities (such as convex ones, 
belief functions) can be viewed as encoding a convex family of probability distributions [35,40]. This connection disappears 
if we give up using addition in the range of the capacity.
* Corresponding author.
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Yet, it is tempting to check whether counterparts of many such quantitative notions can be defined for qualitative capac-
ities, if we replace probability measures by possibility measures. Conjugateness can be recovered if the range of the capacity 
is equipped with an order-reversing map. A qualitative counterpart of a Möbius transform has been introduced by Mesiar 
[31] and Grabisch [25] in 1997 and further studied by Grabisch [26]. The qualitative Möbius transform can be viewed as 
the possibilistic counterpart to a basic probability assignment, whereby a capacity is defined with respect to the latter by 
a qualitative counterpart of the belief function definition, extending as well the definition of possibility measures. In fact 
the process of generation of belief functions, introduced by Dempster [9], was applied very early to possibility measures 
by Dubois and Prade [16,17] so as to generate upper and lower possibilities and necessities. It was noticed that upper 
possibilities and lower necessities are still possibility and necessity measures respectively, but upper necessities and lower 
possibilities are not. However, as we shall see, the formal analogy between belief functions and qualitative capacities via the 
qualitative Möbius transform can be misleading at the interpretive level.
This situation leads to natural questions, namely, whether a qualitative capacity can be expressed in terms of a family of 
possibility measures, and if a qualitative Möbius transform can encode such a family. Previous recent works [11,32] started 
addressing this issue, taking up a pioneering work by Banon [4]. In this paper we show that in the finite (qualitative) setting, 
special subsets of possibility measures play a role similar to convex sets of probability measures. We prove that any capacity 
can be defined in terms of a finite set of possibility measures, either as a lower possibility or an upper necessity function. 
This result should not come as a surprise. Indeed, it has been shown that possibility measures can be refined by probability 
measures using a lexicographic refinement of the basic axiom of possibility measures, and that capacities on a finite set 
can be refined by belief functions [13,14]. Based on this fundamental result we can generalize the maxitivity and minitivity 
axiom of possibility theory so as to define families of qualitative capacities of increasing complexity. Finally, this property 
enables qualitative capacities to be seen as necessity modalities in a non-regular class of modal logics, extending the links 
between possibility theory and modal logic to a potentially larger range of uncertainty theories.
The structure of the paper is as follows.1 Section 2 provides basic definitions pertaining to capacities, recalls and dis-
cusses the similarity between belief functions and qualitative capacities, indicating the limitation of this analogy. Section 3
provides the main contribution of this paper, namely it shows the formal analogy between qualitative capacities and impre-
cise probabilities, proving any capacity comes down to any of two families of possibility distributions, and can be described 
by finite sets thereof, either as a lower possibility or an upper necessity function. This section also extends these results to 
Sugeno integrals. Section 4 provides an algorithm that computes the set of minimal elements among possibility measures 
that dominate a capacity from its qualitative Möbius transforms. Section 5 axiomatically defines subfamilies of qualitative 
capacities of increasing complexity generalizing the maxitive and the minitivity axioms of possibility theory. Finally, in 
Section 6 we lay bare a connection between capacities and neighborhood semantics in non-regular modal logics, which 
suggests potential applications to reasoning from conflicting information coming from several sources.
2. Qualitative capacities and Möbius transforms
Consider a finite set S and a finite totally ordered scale L = {λ0 = 0 < λ1 < · · · < λℓ = 1} with top 1 and bottom 0. 
Moreover we assume that L is equipped with an order-reversing map, i.e., a strictly decreasing mapping ν : L → L with 
ν(1) = 0 and ν(0) = 1. Note that ν is unique, and such that ν(λi) = λℓ−i .
Definition 1. A capacity (or fuzzy measure) is a mapping γ : 2S → L such that γ (∅) = 0; γ (S) = 1; and if A ⊆ B then 
γ (A) ≤ γ (B). The conjugate of γ is the capacity γ c defined as γ c(A) = ν(γ (Ac)), ∀A ⊆ S , where Ac is the complement of 
set A.
The value γ (A) can be interpreted as the degree of confidence in a proposition represented by the set A of possible 
states of the world, or, if S is a set of criteria, the degree of importance of the group of criteria A [27]. In this paper we 
basically use the first interpretation, unless specified otherwise. We here speak of qualitative capacity (or q-capacity, for 
short) to mean that we only rely on an ordinal structure, not an additive underlying structure.
Remark 1. In fact, even if the scale is encoded by means of numbers in [0, 1], we do not assume these figures represent 
orders of magnitude, so that their addition or subtraction make no sense. Of course, we could construct a q-capacity using 
a probability measure P on S , and considering {P (A) : A ⊆ S} as the totally ordered set L by renaming the numbers using 
symbols λi . It is always possible to do so using any numerical capacity on S . However, since the symbols λi only encode 
a ranking, we then are unable to distinguish between capacities that yield the same ordering of events (in particular the 
probability measure P can no longer be distinguished from the many non-additive numerical capacities that yield the same 
ordering of events as P ). So qualitative here presupposes that the “distance” between two consecutive λi ’s can be arbitrary. 
And in our view, a numerical set-function is a special case of a qualitative one with additional structure in its range.
Important special cases of capacity are possibility and necessity measures.
1 This paper is based on and extends two previous conference papers [11,21].
Definition 2. A possibility measure is a capacity that satisfies the characteristic axiom of maxitivity:
γ (A ∪ B)=max
(
γ (A),γ (B)
)
.
A possibility measure is usually denoted by Π . In possibility theory [18,20], the available information is represented by 
means of a possibility distribution [42]. This is a function, usually denoted by π , from the universe of discourse S to the 
scale L, such that π(s) = 1 for some element s ∈ S . The associated possibility measure is defined by
Π(A)=max
s∈A
π(s)
and in the finite case any possibility measure induces a unique possibility distribution π(s) = Π({s}). The function π is 
supposed to rank-order potential values of (some aspect of) the state of the world – according to their plausibility. The value 
π(s) is understood as the possibility that s be the actual state of the world. Precise information corresponds to the situation 
where ∃s∗ , π(s∗) = 1, and ∀s 6= s∗ , π(s) = 0, while complete ignorance is represented by the vacuous possibility distribution
denoted by π? , such that ∀s ∈ S , π?(s) = 1. A possibility distribution π is said to be more specific (in the wide sense) than 
another possibility distribution ρ if ∀s ∈ S , π(s) ≤ ρ(s). It defines a partial order between possibility distributions, reflecting 
their relative informativeness.
Definition 3. A necessity measure is a capacity that verifies the characteristic axiom of minitivity:
γ (A ∩ B)=min
(
γ (A),γ (B)
)
.
A necessity measure is usually denoted by N . Function N is characterized by an “impossibility” distribution ι : S → L
as ι(s) = N(S \ {s}), since N(A) =mins/∈A ι(s). Note that the conjugate N(A) =Π
c(A) = ν(Π(Ac)) of a possibility measure 
is a necessity measure such that ι(s) = ν(π(s)), which explains the interpretation of ι(s) as a degree of impossibility. It 
is also called a degree of potential surprise by Shackle [36], or a grade of disbelief by Spohn [37] (who use numerical 
representations thereof).
Possibility distributions seem to play in the qualitative setting a role similar to probability distributions in the numerical 
setting, replacing sum by maximum. In this scope, it is well-known that, in the finite case, the probability distribution of 
a probability measure is generalized by the Möbius transform of the capacity. In this section we recall qualitative Möbius 
transforms that were first proposed by Grabisch [25] and Mesiar [31], and discuss the analogy it suggests between belief 
functions and qualitative capacities.
2.1. Qualitative Möbius transforms
Definition 4. The inner (qualitative) Möbius transform of a capacity γ is a mapping γ# : 2
S → L defined by
γ#(E)=
{
γ (E) if γ (E) >maxB(E γ (B)
0 otherwise.
A set E such that γ#(E) > 0 is called a focal set.
In the above definition, due to the monotonicity property of γ , the condition γ (E) >maxB(E γ (B) can be replaced by 
γ (E) >maxx∈E γ (E \ {x}). It is easy to check that
• γ#(∅) = 0; maxA⊆S γ#(A) = 1;
• If A ⊂ B , and γ#(B) > 0, then γ#(A) < γ#(B).
Let F(γ ) = {E, γ#(E) > 0} be the family of focal sets associated to γ . The last property says that the inner qualitative 
Möbius transform of γ is strictly monotonic with respect to inclusion of focal sets.
Example 1. Let S = {s1, s2, s3} and γ ({s1}) = γ ({s1, s3}) = 0.3, γ ({s1, s2}) = 0.7, γ ({s2, s3}) = γ ({s1, s2, s3}) = 1 (so L is 
chosen arbitrarily as {0, 0.3, 0.7, 1}), and γ (A) = 0 otherwise. Then F(γ ) = {{s1}, {s1, s2}, {s2, s3}}, with γ#({s1}) = 0.3, 
γ#({s1, s2}) = 0.7 and γ#({s2, s3}) = 1. ✷
It is clear that the inner qualitative Möbius transform of a possibility measure coincides with its possibility distribution: 
Π#(A) = π(s) if A = {s} and 0 otherwise. Hence the set of focal sets F(Π) is made of singletons only. This property makes 
it clear that γ# generalizes the notion of possibility distribution to the power set of S .
Just like in the numerical setting, the focal sets associated to a necessity measure N form a collection of nested sets 
E1 ⊂ E2 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Ek such that N(A) =maxE i⊆A N#(E i). If the necessity measure is based on a possibility distribution π such 
that N(A) =mins/∈A ν(π(s)), where ν is the order-reversing map on L, then F(N) = {E i = {s : π(s) ≥ λi} : λi ∈ L \ {0}}, and 
N#(E i) = ν(λi−1). A set of the form {s : π(s) ≥ λi > 0} is called a cut of π . So the focal sets of N are the cuts of the 
possibility distribution of its conjugate.
More generally, the inner (qualitative) Möbius transform contains the minimal information needed to reconstruct the 
capacity γ since, by construction [25,13]:
γ (A)=max
E⊆A
γ#(E). (1)
The reader can check that if one of the values γ#(E) is changed, the corresponding capacity will be different, namely the 
values γ (A) such that γ (A) = γ#(E).
Remark 2. Another qualitative counterpart of Möbius transforms, named outer qualitative Möbius transforms, can be used to 
represent a capacity γ . It is a mapping γ # : 2S → L defined by
γ #(A)=
{
γ (A) if γ (A) <minA⊂F γ (F )
1 otherwise.
(2)
In particular, γ #(S) = 1. Due to the monotonicity of γ , the condition γ (A) <minA⊂F γ (F ) can be equivalently replaced by 
γ (A) <mins/∈A γ (A ∪ {s}).
The original capacity is then retrieved as [14]:
γ (A)=min
A⊆F
γ #(F ). (3)
Note that γ (A) is recovered from γ # via weights assigned to supersets of set A, which reminds of outer measures, while 
γ# can be called an inner qualitative mass function.
It is worth noticing that the inner qualitative Möbius transform γ c# of γ
c is related to the outer qualitative Möbius 
transform γ # [13,14]:
γ #(E)= ν
(
γ c#
(
Ec
))
(4)
since γ (A) <minA⊂F γ (F ) also writes γ
c(Ac) >maxF c⊂Ac γ
c(F c). So if we use capacities and their conjugates, using the 
inner and the outer qualitative Möbius transforms conjointly is redundant. In this paper, we only use inner ones.
Example 1 (continued). In the previous example, it can be checked that γ #({s2}) = γ
#({s3}) = 0, γ
#({s1, s2}) = 0.7, 
γ #({s1, s3}) = 0.3 (and γ
#(E) = 1 otherwise). ✷
2.2. May qualitative capacities be interpreted as qualitative belief functions?
The similarity between capacities and belief functions is striking on Eq. (1). A belief function [34] is a set function 
2S →[0, 1] defined by
Bel(A)=
∑
E:E⊆A
m(E), ∀A ⊆ S (5)
where m is a basic probability assignment, i.e. a probability distribution over 2S \ {∅}. The degree Bel(A) is a degree of belief 
or certainty in the sense that Bel(A) = 1 means A is certain, while Bel(A) = 0 means A is at best unknown. The conjugate 
set function
Pl(A)= 1− Bel
(
Ac
)
=
∑
E:E∩A 6=∅
m(E), ∀A ⊆ S (6)
expresses the idea of possibility or plausibility, as Pl(A) = 0 means that A is impossible. The mass assignment m can be 
reconstructed from Bel by inverting the system of equations defining the latter: this is the Möbius transform [34]. In Eq. (1), 
max replaces the sum in the expression of Bel.
Hence function γ# stands as the qualitative counterpart to a basic probability assignment in the theory of evidence, 
obtained via a kind of Möbius transform [26]. By analogy with the numerical case, γ# can be called a basic possibility 
assignment [32] associated with γ since γ# is a possibility distribution on the power set of S . The subsets E that receive a 
positive support play the same role as the focal sets in Dempster–Shafer theory: they are the primitive items of knowledge. 
The parallel between possibility and probability is confirmed: the focal sets of a qualitative possibility measure in the sense 
of the inner Möbius mass function are singletons, just as the focal sets of a probability measure for the standard Möbius 
transform are singletons.
However there are differences between numerical and qualitative Möbius transforms. While an inner qualitative Möbius 
transform can be viewed as a possibility distribution on the power set of S , the converse is not true. Indeed, a possibility 
distribution πm on a space 2
S is not requested to satisfy the monotonicity constraint of a qualitative Möbius transform. 
It means that several basic possibility assignments may yield the same capacity γ (A) = maxE⊆A πm(E), in contrast with 
the setting of evidence theory, where there is a one-to-one correspondence between belief functions and basic probability 
assignments.
Remark 3. If πm is a possibility distribution over 2
S , monotonicity can be restored by deleting the terms πm(F ) whenever 
∃E , E ⊂ F , πm(E) > πm(F ). Clearly, if for some F ⊆ A, there is E1 ⊂ F , πm(E1) > πm(F ), then γ (A) =maxE⊆A,E 6=F πm(E). 
So we define a unique qualitative Möbius mass from πm as follows: γ#(E) = πm(E) > 0 if and only if ∀F ⊂ E , πm(E) >
πm(F ), otherwise γ#(E) = 0. The inner qualitative Möbius transform is the canonical (monotonic) possibility assignment 
associated with the capacity in the sense that all other possibility assignments contain redundant information with respect 
to reconstructing the capacity and only γ# can be recovered in a non-ambiguous way from γ .
It is also possible to introduce the counterpart of the contour function [34]2 of a belief function (it is µ : S → [0, 1]
defined by µ(s) =
∑
E∋sm(E)). Namely,
Definition 5. The qualitative contour function of a capacity γ is the possibility distribution
πγ (s)=max
E∋s
γ#(E).
Note that it is a possibility distribution since πγ (s) = 1 for some s ∈ S . Finally, the qualitative counterpart of a plausibility 
function, in conformity with Eq. (6) is:
Πγ (A)= max
A∩E 6=∅
γ#(E).
It is easy to see that Πγ is just a possibility measure such that Πγ (A) ≥ γ (A), ∀A. In contrast, in the numerical setting, 
replacing max by a sum, and using a mass function, one gets a plausibility measure, i.e. a special case of upper probability 
function more general than a possibility measure and a probability measure. It can be proved that the possibility distribution 
associated with Πγ is precisely the qualitative contour function:
Proposition 1. ∀A, Πγ (A) =maxs∈A πγ (s).
Proof. To see it just note that {E : A ∩ E 6= ∅} = {E, ∃s ∈ A ∩ E}. So Πγ (A) =maxs∈A maxE∋s γ#(E). ✷
In the numerical setting, we do not have that Pl(A) =maxs∈A µ(s) (nor have we Pl(A) =
∑
s∈A µ(s)). The meaning of the 
qualitative contour function as a special upper possibilistic approximation of γ will be laid bare at the end of Section 4.
Example 1 (continued). For the capacity in Example 1, the reader can check that πγ (s1) =max(γ#({s1}), γ#({s1, s2})) = 0.7, 
πγ (s2) =max(γ#({s2, s3}), γ#({s1, s2})) = 1, and πγ (s3) = γ#({s2, s3}) = 1. ✷
In the construction of Dempster [9], a belief function is actually a special case of a lower probability bound induced 
by a probability space (Ω, P ) and a multi-valued mapping, Γ : Ω → 2S as Bel(A) = P ({ω ∈ Ω : Γ (ω) ⊆ A}). Considering 
the selection functions f of Γ (i.e., ω ∈ Ω , f (ω) ∈ Γ (ω)) and the probability functions P f induced by (Ω, P ) on S as 
P f (A) = P ( f
−1(A)), it holds (in the finite case) that Bel(A) =min f ∈Γ P f (A) [8].
In contrast, in the qualitative case, any capacity can be generated by this process, replacing probability by possibility. The 
possibilistic counterpart of Dempster process has been studied at length by Dubois and Prade [17] and more recently by De 
Baets and Tsiporkova [39]. Given a possibility distribution π on Ω , we can thus define an upper possibility function Π =
max f ∈Γ Π f (A) and a lower possibility function Π =min f ∈Γ Π f (A) where Π f (A) = Π( f
−1(A)) and Π is the possibility 
measure associated to a possibility distribution π :Ω→[0, 1].
Since any capacity can be expressed by a monotonic possibility assignment, it can always be viewed as a lower possibility, 
as we shall see in the next section. Indeed if we choose Ω = F , the set of focal sets of γ , and let π = γ# , then γ (A) =
min f ∈Γ Π f (A) =Π , while Π =Πγ . As a consequence, Π and Π are not conjugate set-functions, contrary to the case of 
belief functions. Especially, we cannot use the conjugate function Π c , that is, the necessity measure induced by the contour 
function of γ as a lower bound for the latter. Indeed
Nγ (A)= ν
(
Πγ
(
Ac
))
=min
s/∈A
ν
(
max
E∋s
γ#(E)
)
= min
E∩Ac 6=∅
ν
(
γ#(E)
)
,
which cannot be compared with γ (A).
2 Also called one-point coverage function in the literature of random sets.
Summarizing, the situation of qualitative capacities with respect to possibility measures is different from the one of 
numerical capacities with respect to probabilities in several respects:
• Any qualitative capacity is a lower possibility, while not any numerical capacity is a lower probability. Some are upper 
probabilities only (for instance the vacuous possibility function Π?) and some are neither upper nor lower probability 
bounds. There is no probability function acting as the counterpart of the vacuous possibility function. The interpretation 
of a belief function as measuring belief or certainty,3 as opposed to plausibility, does not carry over to qualitative 
capacities, even if the definition of a capacity via γ# bears a formal similarity with belief functions, and capacities can 
be generated as lower bounds of possibility functions.
• In particular, since the set-function γ# can also be viewed as a possibility distribution over the power set 2
S , expression 
(1) is also a generalization of the definition of the degree of possibility of a set in terms of a possibility distribution on 
S as pointed out earlier.
• The one-to-one correspondence between random sets (using Möbius masses m) and belief functions does not carry over 
to qualitative capacities: the set of possibility distributions on 2S can be partitioned into equivalence classes, one per 
capacity γ , each containing the inner qualitative Möbius transform of some capacity, and all possibility distributions in 
the class generating the same γ . It is clear that γ# is the least element (eventwisely) of the equivalence class attached 
to γ .
• The qualitative counterpart to a plausibility function is a possibility function that dominates the capacity, and its possi-
bility distribution is the qualitative contour function of the capacity.
Due to this state of facts, there is a big mathematical and semantic difference between belief functions and qualitative 
capacities.
Remark 4. Wong et al. [41] have shown that, in order to be representable by a numerical belief function, a qualitative 
capacity must satisfy the axiom
BEL: ∀A, B,C disjoint, if γ (A ∪ B) > γ (A) then γ (A ∪ B ∪ C) > γ (A ∪ C).
This is a weakening of the well-known De Finetti axiom of comparative probability:
If ∀A ∩ (B ∪ C)= ∅ then, γ (B)≥ γ (C) if and only if γ (A ∪ B) > γ (A ∪ C),
which is known to be insufficient to characterize numerical probability on finite sets [24]. Curiously, even if a capacity γ
fails to satisfy axiom BEL, it almost satisfies it in the sense that the following property always holds [14]:
∀A, B,C disjoint, if γ (A ∪ B) > γ (A) then γ (A ∪ B ∪ C)≥ γ (A ∪ C).
However, using contraposition, the following dual axiom, another specialization of the latter property (distinct from BEL):
PL: ∀A, B,C disjoint, if γ (A ∪ B ∪ C) > γ (A ∪ C) then γ (A ∪ B) > γ (A)
makes γ representable by a plausibility function. It means that the weak ordering of events induced by any capacity can 
be refined by a weak ordering representable by a belief function or by a plausibility function [14], which confirms that the 
formal analogy between capacities and belief functions proper is misleading.
3. Capacities as lower possibility and upper necessity functions
It is well-known that a belief function can be equivalently represented by a non-empty convex set of probabilities, 
namely P(Bel) = {P , P (A) ≥ Bel(A), ∀A ⊆ S}. Then it holds that Bel(A) =minP∈P(Bel) P (A). In other words a belief function 
is one example of coherent lower probability in the sense of Walley [40] (exact capacity after Schmeidler [35]). The set 
P(Bel) is called the credal set representing Bel.4 If the range of the set-function is not equipped with addition and product, 
this construction is impossible. The natural question is then whether a similar construction may make sense with qualitative 
possibility measures in place of probability measures, using min and max instead of product and sum. From previous 
preliminary results [17,39,4] we know the answer is positive. In this paper, we investigate the problem in depth, without 
resorting to Dempster setting.
3 Bel(A) = 1 means that A is totally certain.
4 In the case of a general numerical capacity g , the probability set P(g) may be empty.
3.1. Capacities as lower possibilities
There is always at least one possibility measure that dominates any capacity: the vacuous possibility measure, based on 
the distribution π? expressing ignorance, since for any capacity γ , ∀A 6= ∅ ⊂ S , Π?(A) = 1 ≥ γ (A), and Π?(∅) = γ (∅) = 0.
Let R(γ ) = {π : Π(A) ≥ γ (A), ∀A ⊆ S} be the non-empty set of possibility distributions whose corresponding set-
functions Π dominate γ . In analogy to the corresponding notion in game theory [35], we call R(γ ) the possibilistic core of 
the capacity γ . Clearly, R(γ ), equipped with the partial order of specificity (introduced at the beginning of Section 2), is 
an upper semi-lattice, that is if π1, π2 ∈R(γ ), then max(π1, π2) ∈R(γ ). Of course, the maximal element of R(γ ) is the 
vacuous possibility distribution π? , but it has several minimal elements. We denote by R∗(γ ) the set of minimal elements 
in R(γ ).
Any capacity γ can be reconstructed using possibility measures induced by permutations. Let us present this result in 
details. Let σ be a permutation of the n = |S| elements in S . The ith element of the permutation is denoted by sσ (i) . 
Moreover let S iσ = {sσ (i), . . . , sσ (n)}. Define the possibility distribution π
γ
σ as follows:
∀i = 1, . . . ,n, π
γ
σ (sσ (i))= γ
(
S iσ
)
. (7)
There are at most n! (number of permutations) such possibility distributions, that are called the marginals of γ .
Example 1 (continued). If we take the permutation σ = (1, 2, 3), we get π
γ
σ (s3) = γ ({s3}) = 0, π
γ
σ (s2) = γ ({s2, s3}) = 1, 
π
γ
σ (s1) = γ (S) = 1.
If we take the permutation τ = (3, 2, 1), we get π
γ
τ (s1) = γ ({s1}) = 0.3, π
γ
τ (s2) = γ ({s1, s2}) = 0.7, π
γ
τ (s3) =
γ (S) = 1. ✷
This is similar to the case of a numerical capacity g from which a set of probability distributions p
g
σ of the form 
p
g
σ (sσ (i)) = g(S
i
σ ) − g(S
i+1
σ ) can be extracted. If g is a belief function,
5 the convex hull of these probabilities coincide with 
the (non-empty) credal set P(g).
Similarly, it can be checked that the marginals of γ lie in R(γ ) and enable γ to be reconstructed (already in [4]):
Lemma 1. Π
γ
σ (A) ≥ γ (A), ∀A ⊆ S.
Proof. Consider a given permutation σ and an event A. Let iA =max{i, A ⊆ S
i
σ }. Then S
iA
σ is the smallest set in the sequence 
{S iσ }i that contains A and Π
γ
σ (A) =Π
γ
σ (S
iA
σ ) = π
γ
σ (sσ (i)) since A contains sσ (iA ) and other elements in A are of the form 
sσ ( j) , j ≥ iA by construction. Hence, by construction, Π
γ
σ (A) = γ (S
iA
σ ) ≥ γ (A). ✷
Proposition 2. ∀A ⊆ S, γ (A) =minσ Π
γ
σ (A).
Proof. From the lemma, γ (A) ≤minσ Π
γ
σ (A). Conversely, ∀A ⊆ S , there is a permutation σA such that A = S
i
σA
. By con-
struction γ (A) =Π
γ
σA (A) ≥minσ Π
γ
σ (A). ✷
As consequences, we have the following results:
Proposition 3. For all A ⊆ S, γ (A) =minπ∈R(γ )Π(A).
Proof. For all π ∈ R(γ ), Π ≥ γ so γ (A) ≤ minπ∈R(γ )Π(A). Moreover there exists σ such that γ (A) = Π
γ
σ (A) ≥
minπ∈R(γ )Π(A), and, by Lemma 1, we know that π
γ
σ ∈R(γ ). ✷
Proposition 4. ∀π ∈R(γ ), π(s) ≥ π
γ
σ (s), ∀s ∈ S for some permutation σ of S.
Proof. Just consider a permutation σ induced by π , that is σ (i) ≥ σ ( j) ⇐⇒ π(si) ≤ π(s j). For this permutation, Π(S
i
σ ) =
π(si) ≥ γ (S
i
σ ) = π
γ
σ (si), ∀i = 1, . . . , n. ✷
This result says that the set of marginals π
γ
σ includes the set R∗(γ ) of least elements of R(γ ), i.e., the most specific 
possibility distributions dominating γ . In other terms, R(γ ) = {π : ∃σ , π ≥ π
γ
σ }. Not all the n! possibility distributions 
π
γ
σ are least elements of R(γ ). As a trivial example, if γ =Π , this least element is unique and is precisely π . But other 
permutations yield other less specific possibility distributions. A more efficient method for generating R∗(γ ) is provided in 
Section 4.
5 More generally, γ may be a convex capacity: g(A ∪ B) + g(A ∩ B) ≥ g(A) + g(B).
Table 1
Least elements of the possibilistic core (R∗(γ )) for Ex-
ample 1.
S s1 s2 s3
π1 0.3 1 0
π2 0.7 0 1
π3 0.3 0.7 1
By construction R∗(γ ) is a finite set of possibility distributions none of which is more specific that another, that is, if 
π , ρ ∈R∗(γ ), ∃s1 6= s2 ∈ S , π(s1) > ρ(s1) and π(s2) < ρ(s2). We thus can prove the following basic result:
Proposition 5. ∀A ⊆ S, γ (A) =minπ∈R∗(γ )Π(A).
Proof. As ∀π ∈R∗(γ ), Π ≥ γ , it holds that γ (A) ≤minπ∈R∗(γ )Π(A). Now suppose ∃A, γ (A) <minπ∈R∗(γ )Π(A). Then 
∀π ∈ R∗(γ ), Π(A) > γ (A). However there is π
′ ∈ R(γ ) \ R∗(γ ) such that Π
′(A) = γ (A) < Π(A). Hence π ′ is either 
more specific than some π ∈R∗(γ ) (which is impossible since R∗(γ ) contains the most specific elements in R(γ )) or 
incomparable with all π ∈R∗(γ ), which would mean inside it, which is contrary to the assumption. ✷
Example 1 (continued). For instance, the three least specific possibility distributions that dominate γ in Example 1 are given 
in Table 1. They are not comparable and one can check that γ (A) =min(Π1(A), Π2(A), Π3(A)). ✷
These findings also show that any capacity can be represented by a finite set of possibility measures. Conversely, for any 
set T of possibility distributions, the set-function γ (A) =minπ∈T Π(A) is a capacity, and it is easy to see that T ⊆R(γ ). 
If T only contains possibility distributions that are not comparable with respect to specificity, T =R∗(γ ), the most specific 
elements of R(γ ).
Remark 5. Note that the set function maxπ∈T Π(A) is not only a capacity, but also a possibility measure with possibility 
distribution πmax(s) =maxπ∈T π(s) [19].
It is interesting to consider the closure of R∗(γ ) under the qualitative counterpart of a convex combination [15]:
Definition 6. If π1, . . . , πk are possibility distributions and ∀α1, . . . , αk ∈ L, such that max
k
i=1 αi = 1, the qualitative mixture 
of the πi ’s is max
k
i=1min(αi, πi). The q-convex closure C(T ) of the set T of possibility distributions is the set of qualitative 
mixtures of elements of T .
Note that the qualitative mixture of possibility distributions is a possibility distribution (it is normalized) and 
maxki=1min(αi, Πi) is a possibility measure with distribution max
k
i=1min(αi, πi) [19]. We then define the q-convex core
of the capacity γ by C(R∗(γ )), which possesses a maximal element, i.e., the possibility measure with distribution 
maxπ∈R∗(γ )π . Clearly C(R∗(γ )) is in general a proper q-convex subset of R(γ ), that is analogous to a numerical credal 
set.6 The minimal set R∗(γ ) plays the same role as extreme probabilities in credal sets (the vertices of a convex polyhe-
dron), from which the latter can be reconstructed via convex closure.
3.2. Capacities as upper necessities
We can dually describe capacity functions as upper necessities by means of a family of necessity functions that stem 
from the lower possibility description of their conjugates. Clearly, possibility measures that dominate γ c are conjugates of 
necessity measures dominated by γ . In other words γ is also an upper necessity measure in the sense that
Proposition 6.
γ (A)= max
π∈R∗(γ c)
N(A).
Proof. γ c(A) = minπ∈R∗(γ c)Π(A). Hence, γ (A) can also be expressed as: γ (A) = ν(minπ∈R∗(γ c)Π(A
c)) =
maxπ∈R∗(γ c) ν(Π(A
c)). ✷
6 In the numerical setting, core and credal set coincide.
However, this result can be directly obtained from the expression (1) of γ . Indeed, if E is a focal set of γ , define 
the necessity measure NE by ∀A 6= S , NE(A) = γ#(E) if E ⊆ A and 0 otherwise (its focal sets are E , S , with qualitative 
Möbius weights NE#(A) = γ#(E) and NE#(S) = 1). It is clear that γ (A) =maxE∈F(γ ) NE(A). This is not the minimal form of 
course. To get the minimal form one may consider all maximal chains of nested focal subsets Ci = {E
1
i ⊂ · · · ⊂ E
ki
i } ⊆F(γ ), 
i = 1, . . . , n: each such chain Ci defines a necessity measure Ni whose nested focal sets are as follows:
• if γ#(E
ki
i ) = 1 then F(Ni) = Ci and Ni#(E
k
i ) = γ#(E
k
i )
• otherwise F(Ni) = Ci ∪ {S} and Ni#(E
k
i ) = γ#(E
k
i ), Ni#(S) = 1.
It is easy to check that if there are n maximal chains of subsets in F(γ ),
γ (A)=
n
max
i=1
max
E∈Ci
γ#(E)=
n
max
i=1
Ni(A) (8)
and Ni(E) = γ#(E), ∀E ∈ Ci .
Example 1 (continued). The set of focal sets of γ in Example 1 contains two maximal chains: ({s1}, {s1, s2}) and {s2, s3}
with respective weights (0.3, 0.7), and 1. Hence we need two necessity measures to represent γ : N1 with focal sets defined 
by N1#({s1}) = 0.3, N1#({s1, s2}) = 0.7, N1#(S) = 1; and a Boolean necessity measure N2 with one focal set defined by 
N2#({s2, s3}) = 1. It can be checked that γ (A) =max(N1(A), N2(A)). ✷
By construction, the cuts of possibility distributions πi underlying Ni and different from S are focal sets of γ . These 
possibility distributions are not comparable with respect to specificity: if they were, they would not correspond to maximal 
nested chains of focal sets. In other words:
Proposition 7. The set of possibility distributions whose cuts are built from the maximal nested chains in F(γ ) is the set R∗(γ
c) of 
possibility distributions dominating the conjugate of γ .
Proof. The πi ’s induced by maximal chains Ci dominate γ
c since the corresponding Ni is dominated by γ . These distribu-
tions are not comparable and the Πi ’s generate γ
c due to Eq. (8). ✷
The conjugate capacity is thus such that γ c(A) =minni=1Πi(A) where Πi are the conjugates of the Ni induced by the 
maximal chains in F(γ ). Let C(π) be the set of cuts of π . Of course, C(πi) =F(Ni). We can show that the focal sets of γ
are precisely the cuts of all πi ’s in R∗(γ
c) (up to set S).
Proposition 8. F(γ ) ⊆
⋃
π∈R∗(γ c)
C(π) ⊆F(γ ) ∪ {S}.
Proof. If E is focal for γ then it appears in one maximal chain Ci hence it is a cut of πi ∈R∗(γ
c). Conversely, if E 6= S
is a cut of π ∈R∗(γ
c), it is a focal set of some N induced by a max-chain C of focal sets of γ . If E = S is a cut of some 
π ∈R∗(γ
c), π corresponds to a maximal chain whose largest set G may differ from S (when γ#(G) < 1). ✷
So it is interesting to notice that there is almost an identity between the focal sets of a capacity and the cuts of the most 
specific possibility distributions that generate its conjugate.
Example 1 (continued). In Example 1, γ (A) =max(N1(A), N2(A)) where N1(A) is induced by π1(s) = 1 if s = s1 , ν(0.3) =
0.7 if s ∈ {s1, s2} \ {s1}, i.e., s = s2 and ν(0.7) otherwise, that is s = s3 . We check that F(N1) = {{s1}, {s1, s2}, S} are the cuts 
of π1 . And N2 is induced by π2(s) = 1 if s ∈ {s2, s3} and 0 otherwise. ✷
One of the representations of γ by means of R∗(γ ) or R∗(γ
c) may contain less elements than the other. For instance, 
if γ is a necessity measure based on possibility distribution π , then R∗(γ
c) = {π} while R∗(γ ) contains several possibility 
distributions (whose focal sets are singletons or S). Note that Π(A) ≥ N(A) =Π c(A), so that it looks more natural to reach 
N from below and Π from above. For the capacity in Example 1, we see that it needs three possibility measures to represent 
it, but only two necessity measures are needed. The results of this section generalize to several possibility measures (the 
least ones that dominate γ ) the obvious remark that the cuts of a possibility distribution inducing a possibility measure are 
the focal sets of the corresponding necessity measure.
3.3. Sugeno integrals as upper or lower possibilistic expectations
The fact that a convex capacity (or a belief function) coincides with a lower probability can be carried out to integrals. 
Namely, the Choquet integral of a real-valued function with respect to a numerical convex capacity is equal to the lower 
expectation with respect to probabilities in the credal set induced by this convex capacity [10]. However, this is not true for 
any capacity and any convex probability set. In this section, we examine the situation with qualitative capacities for which 
a counterpart of Choquet integral exists, namely Sugeno integral (see [29] for an overview of this operator).
Let f : S → L be a function that may serve as a utility function if S is a set of attributes. Sugeno integral is often defined 
as follows [38]:
Sγ ( f )=max
λ∈L
min
(
λ,γ (Fλ)
)
(9)
where Fλ = {s : f (s) ≥ λ} is the set of attributes having best ratings for some object, above threshold λ, and γ (A) is the 
degree of importance of feature set A.
When γ is a possibility measure Π , Sugeno integral simplifies into the possibility integral [23]:
SΠ ( f )=max
s∈S
min
(
π(s), f (s)
)
(10)
which is the prioritized max operator.
An equivalent expression of Sugeno integral is [29]:
Sγ ( f )=max
A⊆S
min
(
γ (A),min
s∈A
f (s)
)
.
In this disjunctive form, the set-function γ can be replaced without loss of information by the inner qualitative Möbius 
transform γ# defined earlier.
Sγ ( f )= max
A∈F(γ )
min
(
γ#(A), f A
)
(11)
where f A =mins∈A f (s). This form makes it clear that it simplifies into the possibility integral (10) if γ =Π . The above 
expression of Sugeno integral has the standard maxmin form of a possibility integral, viewing γ# as a possibility distribution 
over 2S . The similarity of Sugeno integral in the form (11) with the discrete form of Choquet integral using Möbius transform 
[27] is patent. And indeed, it has been proved elsewhere [13,14] that it is possible to refine the ordering induced by Sugeno 
integral with respect to a qualitative capacity on the set of functions f by means of a Choquet integral with respect to a 
belief function that refines the ordering induced by the capacity.
Yet another equivalent expression of Sugeno integral is [29]:
Sγ ( f )=min
A⊆S
max
(
γ
(
Ac
)
, f A
)
(12)
where f A = maxs∈A f (s). Likewise when γ is a necessity measure N = Π
c , based on possibility distribution π , Sugeno 
integral simplifies into a necessity integral [23], as clear in the form (12):
SN( f )=min
s∈S
max
(
ν
(
π(s)
)
, f (s)
)
(13)
which is the prioritized min operator. Besides it is easy to check that the conjugacy property extends to Sugeno integral as
Sγ ( f )= ν
(
Sγ c
(
ν( f )
))
. (14)
As a consequence of results in this section, it can be proved that Sugeno integral is a lower prioritized maximum and an 
upper prioritized minimum:
Proposition 9. Sγ ( f ) = infπ∈R∗(γ ) SΠ ( f ) = supπ∈R∗(γ c) SN ( f ).
Proof. Viewing γ as a lower possibility (Proposition 5) and using the fact that maxxminy f (x, y) is never greater than 
minxmaxy f (x, y), it comes:
Sγ ( f )=max
A⊆S
min
(
min
π∈R∗(γ )
Π(A), f A
)
=max
A⊆S
min
π∈R∗(γ )
min
(
Π(A), f A
)
≤ min
π∈R∗(γ )
max
A⊆S
min
(
Π(A), f A
)
.
Hence we have Sγ ( f ) ≤ infπ∈R∗(γ ) SΠ ( f ).
Conversely, let π f be the marginal of γ obtained from the nested sequence of sets Fλ induced by function f , then 
it is clear that Π f (Fλ) = γ (Fλ), and thus Sγ ( f ) = SΠ f ( f ). As ∃π ∈ R∗(γ ), π f ≥ π , by definition, SΠ f ( f ) ≥ SΠ ( f ) ≥
infπ∈R∗(γ ) SΠ ( f ). Finally, using conjugacy property (14), the other property showing that Sugeno integral is an upper 
prioritized minimum obviously follows. ✷
Remark 6. The obtained equality is not surprising because Sugeno integral with respect to a function coincides with the 
possibility integral with respect to a specific marginal possibility distribution computed from the permutation σ f such that 
f (sσ f (1)) ≤ f (sσ f (2)) ≤ · · · ≤ f (sσ f (|S|)), just as the discrete Choquet integral is a weighted arithmetic mean with respect to 
the probability distribution computed from the capacity with the same permutation.
The significance of the above result stems from the fact that if the set of minimal possibility (resp. necessity) measures 
dominating (resp. dominated by) a qualitative capacity is very small, the computational complexity of the capacity is low. 
Namely, representing a capacity is theoretically exponential in the number of elements |S| of S , while representing a pos-
sibility or a necessity measure is linear (we just need to know the |S| possibility values of singletons). If R∗(γ ) contains k
distributions, only k|S| values are needed to represent γ . A direct consequence is to cut down the complexity the Sugeno 
integral computation with respect to such capacities accordingly (from exponential to linear), which may be instrumental 
in optimization problems using Sugeno integral as a criterion.
4. Computing the minimal dominating possibility measures in the qualitative convex core
In this section we consider the problem of determining the minimal set of n possibility distributions πi that are sufficient 
to generate a given qualitative capacity γ in the form γ =minni=1Πi . The aim of this section is to show that the qualitative 
Möbius transform is instrumental in finding these least elements.
4.1. Selection functions
We need the notion of a selection function from F(γ ), the set of focal sets of γ . A selection function sel : F(γ ) → S
assigns to each focal set A an element s = sel(A) ∈ A. We denote by Σ(F(γ )) the set of selection functions with domain 
F(γ ). Given a capacity γ for any selection function on F(γ ), one can define a possibility distribution π
γ
sel
by letting 
max∅ = 0 and
π
γ
sel
(s)= max
E:sel(E)=s
γ#(E), ∀s ∈ S. (15)
Note that it parallels a similar construction in the theory of belief functions, where the probability assignments pBel
sel
(s) =∑
A:sel(A)=sm(A), ∀s ∈ S turn out to be the vertices of the credal set induced by Bel. In fact, similar results for π
γ
sel
as for 
the n! possibility distributions π
γ
σ can be obtained. Note that if γ =Π , then there is only one possible selection function 
(since focal sets are singletons) and πΠ
sel
= π (as recalled above in Section 2.1).
Proposition 10. For any selection function sel in Σ(F(γ )), Π
γ
sel
(A) ≥ γ (A), ∀A ⊆ S.
Proof.
Π
γ
sel
(A)=max
s∈A
π
γ
sel
(s)=max
s∈A
max
E:sel(E)=s
γ#(E)
≥max
s∈A
max
E⊆A:sel(E)=s
γ#(E)= γ (A)
since for a focal set E ⊆ A, sel(E) ∈ A too, then {E ∈F(γ ) ⊆ A : ∃s ∈ A : sel(E) = s} = {E ∈F(γ ) : E ⊆ A}. ✷
In fact, not all possibility distributions π
γ
sel
are of the form π
γ
σ for a permutation σ .
Example 2 (Counterexample). Suppose S = {s1, s2, s3}, γ#({s1, s3}) = 1, γ#({s2, s3}) = λ < 1. Then consider sel({s1, s3}) = s3
and sel({s2, s3}) = s2 , so that π
γ
sel
(s3) = 1 > π
γ
sel
(s2) = λ > π
γ
sel
(s1) = 0. Using the corresponding permutation, note that 
π
γ
σ (s3) = 1 but π
γ
σ (s2) = γ ({s1, s2}) = 0. However if we choose another selection function sel
′ such that sel′({s1, s3}) =
sel′({s2, s3}) = s3 , π
γ
sel′
corresponds to the above π
γ
σ . ✷
Nevertheless we do have that the set {π
γ
sel
: sel ∈Σ(F(γ ))} also reconstructs γ .
Proposition 11. ∀A ⊆ S, γ (A) =minsel∈Σ(F(γ ))Π
γ
sel
(A).
Proof. Π
γ
sel
(A) =maxs∈A maxE:sel(E)=s γ#(E). To get the equality, let E ⊆ A be such that γ (A) = γ#(E). Choose the selection 
function as follows: assign γ#(E) to an element sE ∈ E; then if γ#(F ) > γ#(E), assign γ#(F ) to some element not in A. 
This is possible, because if γ#(F ) > γ#(E), then F * E , and since γ#(F ) > γ (A), F * A either. For such a selection function, 
Π
γ
sel
(A) = π
γ
sel
(sE ) holds since the only elements in A to which a possibility weight is assigned are sE ∈ E , and possibly 
other sC ∈ C ∩ A 6= ∅, such that γ#(C) < γ#(E). So γ (A) ≥minsel∈Σ(F(γ ))Π
γ
sel
(A) and due to Proposition 10, the converse is 
true as well. ✷
4.2. An algorithm based on useful selection functions
Due to Proposition 11, the set of minimal elements (maximally specific) of R(γ ) is also included in {π
γ
sel
: sel ∈Σ(F(γ ))}. 
But not all selection functions are of interest since we can have redundant possibility distributions.
Example 3. We consider a capacity γ such that the set of focal sets has a common intersection I . We denote E the focal 
set such that γ#(E) = 1 and F a focal set such that γ#(F ) < 1.
We can define a possibility such that π
γ
sel
(s∗) = 1 for some s∗ ∈ I ⊆ E and π
γ
sel
(s) = γ#(F ) for some s ∈ F \ I . But we can 
define a more specific possibility distribution dominating γ : π
γ
sel
(s∗) = 1 for some s∗ ∈ I ⊆ E and 0 otherwise. ✷
Definition 7. A selection function sel is said to be useful for a capacity γ if it is a minimal element in {π
γ
sel
: sel ∈Σ(F(γ ))}.
Let us consider the following algorithm to calculate selection functions sel and the associated possibility distribution π
γ
sel
.
AlgorithmMSUP: Maximal specific upper possibility generation
Input: n focal sets Ek k = 1, . . . , n ranked in decreasing values of γ#(Ek)
i.e., γ#(E1) ≥ · · · ≥ γ#(En)
F ←{E1, · · · , En}
for all s ∈ S let π(s) = 0
repeat
E ← the first element of F
Define sel(E) = s for some s ∈ E
Let π(s) = γ#(E)
Delete E from F
T ←{G ∈F such that s ∈ G}
repeat
G ← the first element of T
Define sel(G) = s
Delete G from T
Delete G from F .
until T = ∅;
until F = ∅;
Result: A possibility distribution π
γ
sel
.
In fact the above algorithm applies the trick in the proof of Proposition 11: the value γ (A) = γ#(E j) is retrieved by a 
possibility distribution where the weights γ#(Ek), k < j are assigned outside A (which is one option offered by the above 
procedure). A selection function sel thus generated satisfies the following property: If sel(E) = s for some E ∈ F(γ ) and 
πsel(s) = γ#(E), then ∀F ∈F(γ ), such that s ∈ F :
• if γ#(E) ≥ γ#(F ) then sel(F ) = s
• if γ#(E) < γ#(F ) then sel(F ) 6= s.
Conversely, a possibility distribution πsel satisfying the above properties is a possible solution for the algorithm MSUP.
Let Σ∗(F(γ )) be the set of selection functions generated by repeated applications of algorithm MSUP, and MSUP(γ ) be 
the corresponding set of possibility distributions.
Note that while not all selection functions πsel yield a permutation σ such that πsel = πσ , this is true for useful selection 
functions. This is due to the ordering of elements generated by the procedure from great to small masses γ#(E j): define 
σ from the sequence of elements s j obtained by one application of the algorithm constructing sel. For πsel , it is clear 
that πsel(sσ (i)) ≤ πsel(sσ ( j)), ∀i > j. Hence πσ (i) = γ (S
σ
i ) =Πsel(S
σ
i ) = πsel(i). Moreover, if two possibility distributions are 
generated by the algorithm, they correspond to different permutations (since each time, different elements receive positive 
masses). So we conclude that MSUP(γ ) is a subset of {πσ : σ permutation of S}.
Proposition 12. If π 6= ρ ∈MSUP(γ ), then neither π > ρ nor π > ρ hold.
Proof. Suppose π > ρ generated by algorithm MSUP, i.e., π ≥ ρ and let s be such that π(s) > ρ(s). Let selπ and selρ be 
the selection functions associated with π and ρ , respectively. Let E be such that selπ (E) = s and π(s) = γ#(E) > ρ(s). 
By construction, selρ(E) = s
′ 6= s. We have ρ(s′) ≥ γ#(E) > ρ(s), so π(s
′) ≥ ρ(s′) > 0 and ∃G , such that selπ (G) = s
′ and 
π(s′) = γ#(G). But since by construction, s
′ ∈ E ∩ G , it follows that γ#(G) ≥ γ#(E) and the algorithm MSUP would en-
force selπ (E)= s
′ , which contradicts the assumption that selπ (E) = s. So π ≥ ρ with π(s) > ρ(s) is in conflict with the 
assumption that π comes from the algorithm. ✷
So the possibility distributions obtained with the algorithm MSUP are not pairwise comparable (they are based on useful 
selections).
Example 4. Let S = {s1, s2, s3, s4} and the focal sets F(γ ) = {{s1, s2}, {s1, s3}, {s2, s3}, {s2, s4}} where γ#({s1, s2}) = 1 >
γ#({s1, s3}) = .8 > γ#({s2, s3}) = .4 > γ#({s2, s4}) = .2. We show all possible applications of the MSUP algorithm, starting 
with F =F(γ ).
• sel({s1, s2}) = s1 , π(s1) = γ#({s1, s2}) = 1, T = {{s1, s3}}, and F = {{s2, s3}, {s2, s4}}.
– sel({s2, s3}) = s2 , π(s2) = γ#({s2, s3}) = .4, T = {{s2, s4}}, and F = ∅.
So, π(s1) = 1, π(s2) = .4, π(s3) = π(s4) = 0. The permutation σ can be (1, 2, 3, 4).
– sel({s2, s3}) = s3 , π(s3) = γ#({s2, s3}) = .4, T = ∅ and F = {{s2, s4}}.
∗ sel({s2, s4}) = s2 , π(s2) = γ#({s2, s4}) = .2, F = ∅.
So, π(s1) = 1, π(s2) = .2, π(s3) = .4, π(s4) = 0. The permutation σ is (1, 3, 2, 4).
∗ sel({s2, s4}) = s4 , π(s4) = γ#({s2, s4}) = .2, F = ∅.
So π(s1) = 1, π(s2) = 0, π(s3) = .4, π(s4) = .2 The permutation σ is (1, 3, 4, 2).
• sel({s1, s2}) = s2 , π(s2) = γ#({s1, s2}) = 1, T = {{s2, s3}, {s2, s4}} and F = {{s1, s3}}.
– sel({s1, s3}) = s1 , π(s1) = γ#({s1, s3}) = .8, F = ∅.
We have π(s1) = .8, π(s2) = 1, π(s3) = π(s4) = 0. The permutation σ can be (2, 1, 3, 4).
– sel({s1, s3}) = s3 , π(s3) = γ#({s1, s3}) = .8, F = ∅.
We have π(s1) = 0, π(s2) = 1, π(s3) = .8, π(s4) = 0. The permutation σ can be (2, 3, 4, 1). ✷
Moreover the family of possibility distributions which can be obtained with the algorithm MSUP is necessary and suffi-
cient to reconstruct the capacity. In order to prove this main result the following one is needed.
Proposition 13. For any permutation σ , there exists a selection function sel corresponding to another permutation τ such that πσ ≥
πτ = πsel .
Proof. Let σ be a permutation of S , and we denote the corresponding elements as si for simplicity. Let π(si) = γ (S i) where 
S i = {si, . . . , sn}. Let us show that we can derive a useful selection function from σ . For each si we shall decide whether or 
not to make it a selection from E ∈F(γ ). Let U be the set of elements not yet decided, and F the current set of focal sets.
• Let U = S and F = F(γ ). If πσ (s j) = 0 for j = i, . . . , n, the elements s j must be discarded from S and will not be 
selected from focal sets. Set U =: {s1, . . . , si−1}.
• For j = i − 1 down to 1
– Select E ∈ F such that s j ∈ E , E ⊆ S j , γ#(E) is maximal, and let sel(E) = s j . If there is none, let πsel(s j) = 0. Delete 
s j from U .
– Let sel(F ) = s j for all F such that s j ∈ F and F ⊆ S j and γ#(F ) ≤ γ#(E), and delete such F from F .
– Set j =: j − 1.
It is clear that the obtained selection function sel is useful. Moreover, it is also obvious that πsel(si) ≤ π(si) since πsel(si) =
γ#(E i) for some E i ⊆ S i . Now if we use the permutation τ such that πsel(sτ (i)) ≤ πsel(sτ ( j)) whenever i > j, then we have 
that πsel = πτ (this is because πsel(sτ (i)) < πsel(sτ ( j)) if and only if γ#(E i) < γ#(E j)). ✷
Example 5 (Generation of a useful selection from a permutation). Consider S = {s1, · · · , s6}. Let γ be such that γ#({s1, s2}) = 1 >
γ#({s2, s3}) = .8 > γ#({s5, s6}) = .7 > γ#({s3, s4, s5}) = .6 > γ#({s1, s6}) = .5.
Consider the permutation σ = (s6, s5, s4, s3, s2, s1). It is clear that πσ (si) = 1, ∀i < 6 and πσ (s6) = 0. This possibility 
distribution is a very loose upper bound of γ . Let us find a more informative permutation via a selection.
We have U = S and F = {{s1, s2}, {s2, s3}, {s5, s6}, {s3, s4, s5}, {s1, s6}}.
1. First we can delete s1 from U and πsel(s1) = 0; U = {s2, · · · , s6}.
2. Then we select E = {s1, s2} and sel({s1, s2}) = s2 . We also let sel({s2, s3}) = s2 .
Now U = {s3, s4, s5, s6} and F = {{s5, s6}, {s3, s4, s5}, {s1, s6}}.
3. We can select no focal set in S3 = {s1, s2, s3}, nor in S4 = {s4, s3, s2, s1}. So πsel(s3) = πsel(s4) = 0.
Now U = {s5, s6} and F = {{s5, s6}, {s3, s4, s5}, {s1, s6}}.
4. Then we select E = {s3, s4, s5} ⊂ S5 = {s1, · · · , s5} and sel({s3, s4, s5}) = s5 .
Now U = {s6} and F = {{s5, s6}, {s1, s6}}.
5. Finally select E = {s5, s6} and let sel({s5, s6}) = sel({s1, s6}) = s6 .
By construction, πsel({s2}) = 1, πsel({s5}) = .6, πsel({s6}) = .7 and 0 otherwise.
It corresponds to several permutations, for instance {s3, s4, s1, s5, s6, s2}, where indeed Πsel({s2, s6, s5, s1, s4, s3}) =
πsel({s2}) = 1, Πsel({s6, s5, s1, s4, s3}) = πsel({s6}) = .7, Πsel({s5, s1, s4, s3}) = πsel({s5}) = .6, Πsel({s1, s4, s3}) =Πsel({s4, s3}) =
Πsel({s3}) = 0. ✷
Now we are in a position to show that useful selection functions provide a minimal set of possibility distributions that 
are enough to represent the possibilistic core of a capacity γ .
Proposition 14. MSUP(γ ) =R∗(γ ), the set of maximally specific possibility distributions such that Π(A) ≥ γ (A).
Proof. Suppose π ∈R(γ ). From Proposition 4, there is a permutation σ of S such that π ≥ πσ . Moreover there is a useful 
selection function sel such that πσ ≥ πsel . Since possibility distributions constructed from a useful selection function are not 
comparable, they form the minimal elements of π ∈R(γ ). ✷
So we have γ (A) =minπγ
sel
∈MSUP(γ )Π
γ
sel
(A). We let the reader apply Algorithm MSUP to Example 1, and realize that it 
yields possibility distributions in Table 1.
Remark 7. Extreme cases:
• Note that if γ#(E) > 0, ∀E 6= ∅ ⊆ S , R∗(γ ) contains all πσ for all permutations, since at each round of the algorithm 
MSUP, it is possible to choose any remaining element and assign the weight γ#(E) > 0 to it for some focal set E .
• If γ is a necessity measure N then its focal sets form a collection of nested sets E1 ⊂ E2 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Ek such that N(A) =
maxE i⊆A N#(E i). The useful selection functions are then such that if sel(E i) = s, sel(Ek) 6= s for k > i and sel(Ek) = s
if s ∈ Ek , k < i. In particular one may choose sel(E i) = s ∈ E1 , ∀E i . But a necessity measure is based on a simple 
possibility distribution π such that N(A) =mins/∈A ν(π(s)), where ν is the order-reversing map on L. So it is not worth 
approximating N from above by a family of possibility distributions.
Finally, the above considerations enable us to lay bare the connection between R∗(γ ) and the contour function of a 
qualitative capacity already characterized in Proposition 1, via the set Σ∗(F(γ )) of useful selections.
Proposition 15. πγ (s) =maxπ∈R∗(γ )π(s).
Proof. Indeed, maxπ∈R∗(γ )π(s) = maxsel∈Σ∗(F(γ ))πsel(s) = maxsel∈Σ∗(F(γ )),sel(E)=s γ#(E) and {E : sel(E) = s, ∀sel ∈
Σ(F(γ ))} = {E : s ∈ E}. Note that ∀E, γ#(E) > 0, there is a useful selection s.t. sel(E) = s and πsel(s) = γ#(E). So, 
maxsel∈Σ∗(F(γ )) πsel(s) =maxE∋s γ#(E). ✷
So the contour function can be viewed as the most specific “consensual” upper possibilistic approximation of γ (viewing 
R∗(γ ) as containing conflicting consonant approximations of γ ).
5. Generalized minitivity and maxitivity axioms
It was pointed out at the end of Section 3 that the representation complexity of a qualitative capacity is measured by 
the number of elements in R∗(γ ) or in R∗(γ
c). This notion can be formalized by properties that generalize maxitivity and 
minitivity in this section.
5.1. The n-adjunction property
For each capacity γ , there is a least integer n along with n necessity measures such that γ (A) =maxni=1 Ni(A). We now 
show that this property can be described by means of an extension of the minitivity axiom of necessity measures of the 
form:
n-adjunction: ∀A1, A2, . . . , An+1 ⊆ S,
n+1
min
i=1
γ (Ai)≤ max
1≤i< j≤n+1
γ (Ai ∩ A j).
Note that the property trivially holds if some of the n + 1 sets are not distinct. When n = 1, this is the usual adjunction 
property min(γ (A), γ (B)) ≤ γ (A ∩ B). It is then equivalent to the minitivity axiom of necessity measures: N(A ∩ B) =
min(N(A), N(B)) since γ is inclusion-monotonic: 1-adjunctive capacities are necessity measures. Note that it fits the idea 
of modeling accepted belief by means of a capacity γ and a threshold λ ∈ L in the sense that the truth of A is accepted 
whenever γ (A) ≥ λ. Then the property min(γ (A), γ (B)) ≤ γ (A ∩ B) is equivalent to saying that whatever the acceptance 
threshold λ, if the truth of A is accepted and the one of B as well, then the truth of the conjunction A ∩ B should be 
accepted as well. The above remark shows that the only capacities that model this situation are necessity measures.
A weaker requirement than minitivity is 2-adjunction that reads.
∀A, B,C, min
(
γ (A),γ (B),γ (C)
)
≤max
(
γ (A ∩ B),γ (B ∩ C),γ (A ∩ C)
)
.
It can be shown that the property is equivalent to the existence of two necessity measures such that ∀A, γ (A) =
max(N1(A), N2(A)) (see [21] for a detailed proof of this case). For instance, the capacity in Example 1 is 2-adjunctive.
In the general case, it holds that
Proposition 16. minn+1i=1 γ (Ai) ≤maxi 6= j γ (Ai ∩ A j), ∀A1, A2, . . . , An+1 ⊆ S if and only if there exist n necessity measures such that 
∀A, γ (A) =maxnj=1 N j(A).
Proof. ⇐: Suppose ∀A, γ (A) =maxnj=1 N j(A). As a consequence:
n+1
min
i=1
γ (Ai)=
n+1
min
i=1
n
max
j=1
N j(Ai)=
n+1
min
i=1
N ji (Ai)
where N ji (Ai) ≥ Nk(Ai), ∀k 6= ji , k = 1, . . . , n, i = 1, . . . , n + 1. It is clear that at least two among indices ji , i = 1, n + 1
are equal, since there are only n distinct values of j. Suppose they are j1 = 1 = j2 without loss of generality, that is, 
minn+1i=1 γ (Ai) =min(N1(A1), N1(A2), min
n+1
i=3 N ji (Ai)).
Now γ (A1 ∩ A2) = max
n
i=1 Ni(A1 ∩ A2) = max
n
i=1min(Ni(A1), Ni(A2)). However by assumption N1(A1) ≥ Nk(A1), k =
2, . . . , n and N1(A2) ≥ Nk(A2), k = 2, . . . , n so
min
(
N1(A1),N1(A2)
)
≥min
(
Nk(A1),Nk(A2)
)
, k= 2, . . . ,n.
As a consequence,
γ (A1 ∩ A2)=min
(
N1(A1),N1(A2)
)
=min
(
γ (A1),γ (A2)
)
≥
n+1
min
i=1
γ (Ai).
⇒: For the converse, suppose that non-trivially, γ (A) =maxn+1i=1 Ni(A). Then one may find a family of n + 1 distinct sets 
Ai such that γ (Ai) = Ni(Ai), i = 1, . . . , n + 1 and also choose them such that
n+1
min
i=1
γ (Ai) > max
1≤i< j≤n+1
γ (Ai ∩ A j).
Indeed, choose the n + 1 distinct sets Ai with γ (Ai) = Ni(Ai) and γ (A) = 0, ∀A ⊂ Ai , i = 1, . . . , n + 1. These are the least 
elements of the family: {D : γ (D) > 0} that is formed by a union of n +1 filters exactly7 (they are the cores of the possibility 
distributions inducing Ni , i = 1, n + 1). It is then clear that none of the Ai ’s are included into one another, so that ∀i < j, 
Ai ∩ A j ⊂ Ai and Ai ∩ A j ⊂ A j (strict inclusion) hence γ (Ai ∩ A j) = 0 by construction; so, max1≤i< j≤n+1 γ (Ai ∩ A j) = 0. ✷
Due to Proposition 7, if a capacity is n-adjunctive, it means that there are exactly n chains of nested focal sets in F(γ ).
Remark 8. In the numerical setting, the n-superadditivity of a capacity is implied by but does not imply its n +
1-superadditivity. The above concept of n-adjunction seem to play a similar role: we can generalize necessity functions 
by steps since n-adjunction implies but is not implied by n + 1-adjunction. However, note that the n-superadditivity of a 
capacity does not determine the number of extreme points in its corresponding credal set, while the n-adjunction property 
of a capacity ensures that the number of least elements in its possibilistic core is upper-bounded by n.
Of course the above results can be adapted, replacing necessity measures by possibility measures and weakening the 
notion of maxitivity. We can consider the following axiom, dual to n-adjunction:
n-disjunctive dominance: ∀A1, A2, . . . , An+1 ⊆ S,
n+1
max
i=1
γ (Ai)≥ min
1≤i< j≤n+1
γ (Ai ∪ A j).
and prove the counterpart to the last previous proposition:
Proposition 17. maxn+1i=1 γ (Ai) ≥mini 6= j γ (Ai ∪ A j), ∀A1, A2, . . . , An+1 ⊆ S if and only if there exist n possibility measures such 
that γ (A) =minni=1Πi(A).
It is clear that if a capacity γ satisfies the n-adjunction property, its conjugate γ c satisfies the n-disjunctive dominance 
property. Moreover any capacity γ is |MSUP(γ )|-disjunctive-dominating and γ c is |MSUP(γ )|-adjunctive (where | · | denotes 
cardinality).
7 A filter of the Boolean algebra 2S is a family F of sets such that for all A, B ∈F we have A ∩ B ∈F and if A ∈ F , A ⊆ B then B ∈F .
5.2. Connection between n-adjunction and n-maxitive capacities in the sense of Grabisch–Mesiar
A capacity γ is k-maxitive if and only if γ#(A) = 0 if |A| > k and ∃A such that |A| = k and γ#(A) 6= 0. This notion 
has been introduced by Mesiar [31] and Grabisch [25]. This is clearly another way of cutting down the complexity of the 
representation of a capacity, that contrasts with the idea of limiting the number of minimal possibility measures dominating 
it. This section explores the connections between the notions of k-maxitivity and n-adjunction. As we shall see, this issue 
involves the relations between the focal sets of a capacity and the focal sets of its conjugate. We first consider the case of 
Boolean capacities.
k-maxitive Boolean capacities. A Boolean capacity β is such that β(A) ∈ {0, 1}. It is clear that its focal sets are not nested 
(they form an antichain for inclusion).8 We first highlight the condition for which the conjugate of a Boolean capacity takes 
value 1.
Lemma 2. Suppose F(β) = {E1, . . . , Ek} for a Boolean capacity β . Then β
c(A) = 1 if only if ∀E ∈F(β), E ∩ A 6= ∅.
Proof. It can the be checked that: βc(A) = 1 ⇐⇒ β(Ac) = 0 ⇐⇒ ∀E ∈F(β), E * Ac .
Hence: βc(A) = 1 ⇐⇒ ∀E ∈F(β), E ∩ A 6= ∅. ✷
In the case of a Boolean necessity measure N , there is a unique focal set E such that N(A) = 1 if E ⊆ A and 0 otherwise. 
And Π(A) = 1 if E ∩ A 6= ∅ and 0 otherwise. The above lemma extends this definition to capacities adding a quantification 
over focal sets, since we have:
β(A)= 1 if ∃E ∈F(β), E ⊆ A and 0 otherwise;
βc(A)= 1 if ∀E ∈F(β), E ∩ A 6= ∅ and 0 otherwise.
We can then compute the focal sets of βc from those of β by picking one element in each focal set of β . Given a non-empty 
family of sets F = {E1, . . . , Ek} a so-called dual family D(F) can be defined by
D(F)=min
⊆
{
{s1, . . . , sk}, si ∈ E i, i = 1, . . . ,k
}
,
where min⊆ picks the smallest subsets for inclusion. The dual family is also known as containing the minimal hitting sets 
of F .
Proposition 18. For a Boolean capacity β , the set of focal sets of βc is F(βc) =D(F(β)).
Proof. Note that βc(A) = 1 ⇐⇒ ∀E ∈ F(β), ∃sE ∈ E ∩ A ⇐⇒ ∃F = {sE : E ∈ F(β)}, F ⊆ A, where for each focal set E of 
β, sE is picked in E . So, β
c(A) = 1 if only if A contains a set the form {s1, . . . , sk}, si ∈ E i , i = 1, . . . , k. It is obvious that 
F(βc) =min⊆{A : β
c(A) = 1}. ✷
As an obvious example, while a necessity measure has a single focal set E , the focal sets of the conjugate possibility 
measure Π(A) = 1 − N(Ac) are obviously the singletons {s} such that s ∈ E . Note that when there are several focal sets, the 
elements sE , sF picked in overlapping focal sets E and F need not be distinct.
Example 6. Let F(β) = {E1, E2} with E1 = {s0, s1, s3}, E2 = {s0, s2, s4}, then the focal sets of the conjugate are the least 
elements among the family{
{s0}
}
∪
{
{s0, si}, i = 1, . . . ,4
}
∪
{
{s1, s2}, {s1, s4}, {s3, s2}, {s3, s4}
}
,
that is F(βc) = {{s0}, {s1, s2}, {s1, s4}, {s3, s2}, {s3, s4}}. ✷
Proposition 19. D(D(F(β))) =F(β).
Proof. It is obvious because (βc)c = β . A direct proof is far less obvious. ✷
Example 6 (continued). We can write F(βc) = {{s} : s ∈ E1 ∩ E2} ∪ {{s
′, s′′} : s′ ∈ E1 \ E2, s
′′ ∈ E2 \ E1}. To build dual focal 
sets from the latter family, each such focal set must contain E1 ∩ E2 (= {s0}). Then suppose we pick s1 ∈ E1 \ E2 = {s1, s2}. 
Clearly, this choice eliminates all focal sets {s1, s}, s ∈ E2 \ E1 from further consideration, that is, {s1, s4}. It thus prevents us 
8 Note that qualitative Boolean capacities strikingly differ quantitative 0–1 capacities, if 0 and 1 are viewed as usual numbers and we apply the usual 
Möbius transform to the latter. Indeed, for instance Boolean belief functions are necessity measures with a single focal set having mass 1.
from picking the next element in E2 \ E1 . So the next elements to be picked lie in E1 , here s3 . In fact, the focal sets left 
{s, s2}, s 6= s1 can be deprived of s2 since there is a focal set of the form {s1, s2} that forbids s2 from further consideration. 
So this process does reconstruct the focal set E1 . We could similarly build E2 and this would end the process. Any other 
choices of elements would provide sets containing E1 or E2 . ✷
The next result lays bare the connection between k-adjunction of capacities and the notion of k-maxitive capacities, i.e. 
whose focal sets have at most k elements. From Proposition 18, it is clear that
Corollary 1. A Boolean capacity is k-adjunctive if and only if its conjugate is k-maxitive.
Proof. A Boolean capacity β is k-adjunctive if and only if it has k focal sets, since each of them stands for a Boolean 
necessity measure and they are not nested. Now, the above results on computing the focal sets of βc clearly implies that 
the focal sets of its conjugate will have not more than k elements, as they are formed by picking one element in each focal 
subset of β . However, since the focal sets of a Boolean capacity forms an antichain, it is possible to pick k elements, one 
per focal set that is contained in the focal set and not in the other ones. So k is reached. The converse is obvious due to 
Proposition 19. ✷
Example 7. We consider S = {s1, s2, s3} and necessities N1 , N2 associated to the distribution π1 and π2 respectively with 
π1(s1) = 1, π1(s2) = 1, π1(s3) = 0 and π2(s1) = 0, π2(s2) = 1, π2(s3) = 1. Focal sets are {s1, s2} and {s3, s2}. Let β be the 
2-adjunctive capacity defined by β(A) =max(N1(A), N2(A)). Hence F(β
c) = {{s2}, {s1, s3}} and β
c is 2-maxitive. ✷
The reader may notice that the procedure for building focal sets of βc from those of the Boolean β is related to the algo-
rithm MSUP for deriving possibility distributions dominating β from its focal sets, in Section 4. In the light of Propositions 7
and 8, this is not surprising since according to these propositions, each of the focal sets of βc can be viewed as a minimal 
specific possibility distribution that dominates β .
k-maxitive general capacities.
Proposition 20. For a general capacity γ , it holds that,
• ∀λ ∈ L \ {0}, γ c(A) ≥ ν(λ) if and only if ∀E, if γ#(E) > λ, then E ∩ A 6= ∅.
• γ c(A) = ν(λ) 6= 0, 1 if and only if ∀E, if γ#(E) > λ then E ∩ A 6= ∅ and ∃E, γ#(E) = λ such that E ∩ A = ∅.
Proof. For the first statement, γ c(A) ≥ ν(λ) if and only if γ (Ac) ≤ λ if and only if ∀E , if γ#(E) > λ, then E * Ac , that is 
E ∩ A 6= ∅. For the second one, the equality γ c(A) = ν(λ) is attained if on top of the first condition in Proposition 20, there 
is a focal set E ⊆ Ac such that γ#(E) = λ. ✷
In particular, γ c(A) = 1 if and only if E ∩ A 6= ∅, ∀E ∈F(γ ) and γ c(A) > 0, if and only if A intersect all focal sets of γ
with γ#(E) = 1, which generalizes the case of valued possibility measures.
To find the focal sets of γ c in the general case one may use the decomposition of γ as a weighted combination of 
Boolean capacities (see Appendix A). Recall that L = {λ0 = 0 < λ1 < · · ·< λℓ = 1}. Then ν(λi) = λℓ−i , and let γλ be the λ-cut 
of γ , a Boolean capacity such that γλ(A) = 1 if and only if γ (A) ≥ λ. Then, Lemma 2 also writes: γ
c
λi
(A) = 1 if and only if 
∀E ∈ F(γλℓ−i+1 ), E ∩ A 6= ∅. So applying results for Boolean capacities, E is a focal set of γ
c
λi
if and only if it is a minimal 
element of the family {E = {sF : γ#(F ) > λℓ−i}} = {E = {sF : F ∈F(γλℓ−i+1 )}}. In other words,
F
(
γ cλi
)
=D
(
F(γλℓ−i+1)
)
.
We can then compute γ c#(E) as per Corollary 3 in Appendix A: γ
c
#(E) =maxλ:E∈F(γ cλ )
λ.
Example 1 (continued). The focal sets of γ are such that γ#({s1}) = 0.3, γ#({s1, s2}) = 0.7 and γ#({s2, s3}) = 1. Let us 
compute the focal sets of its conjugate.
• γ c#(E) = λ3 = 1, if and only if E ∈D(F(γ )) (it must intersect all focal sets of γ ). So γ
c
#({s1, s2}) = γ
c
#({s1, s3}) = 1.
• γ c#(E) = λ2 = 0.7, if and only if E ∈D(F(γ0.7)) (ℓ = 3 so 0.7 = λℓ−2+1) and must not contain s1 . So γ
c
#({s2}) = 0.7.
• γ c#(E) = λ1 = 0.3, if and only if E ∈D(F(γ1)) (focal sets of γ with weight 1) and must not hit {s1, s2}. So γ
c
#({s3}) = 0.3.
γ c can be easily computed as γ c({s1}) = 0, γ
c({s2}) = 0.7, γ
c({s3}) = 0.3, γ
c({s1, s3}) = 1, γ ({s1, s2}) = 1, γ
c({s2, s3}) = 0.7, 
using its focal sets given above. ✷
Fig. 1. Passages between representations.
These results show how the inner qualitative Möbius transform of a capacity can be computed from the one of its 
conjugate. Note that alternatively, as shown in Section 3.2, we can recover the focal sets of γ c from the cuts of the possibility 
distributions dominating γ obtained by repeated applications of algorithm MSUP.
Regarding k-maxitive functions, it is easy to infer that also in the general case,
Corollary 2. If a capacity has k weighted focal sets, its conjugate will be k-maxitive.
Proof. Indeed, the largest focal sets of γ c (they have weight equal to 1) are obtained by picking one element in each focal 
set of γ . ✷
Fig. 1 summarizes the results obtained so far when switching between representations of γ and its conjugate γ c using 
focal sets and possibility distributions.
6. Modal logic and qualitative capacities
In this section we show the connection between qualitative capacities and weak epistemic modal formalisms relying on 
non-regular modal logics [6]. Consider a propositional language L with variables V = {a, b, c, . . .} with standard connectives 
∧, ∨, ¬, →. ⊤ and ⊥ denote tautology and contradiction respectively. In other words, formulas p in L are as usual 
generated as follows:
• If a ∈ V then a ∈L;
• if p, q ∈L then ¬p ∈L, p ∧ q ∈L;
• p ∨ q ∈L is short for ¬(¬p ∧¬q).
In this section the universe S is the set of interpretations of L.
6.1. The logic of Boolean possibility theory
Consider a higher level propositional language L✷ defined by
• If p ∈L then ✷p ∈L✷;
• if φ, ψ ∈L✷ then ¬φ ∈L✷ , φ ∧ψ ∈L✷ .
Note that the language L is embedded inside L✷ , since atomic variables of L✷ are of the form ✷p, p ∈L. As usual ✸p
stands for ¬✷¬p. It defines a very elementary fragment of a modal logic language proposed by Banerjee and Dubois under 
the name MEL [2,3].
Given a necessity measure N on S , denote by |H ✷p the statement N(A) ≥ λ > 0, where A = [p] the set of models 
of p. ✷p corresponds to a Boolean necessity measure based on a possibility distribution that is the characteristic function 
of E = {s : π(s) > ν(λ)} the largest focal set of N such that N#(E) ≥ λ. Then |H ✸p stands for Π(A) ≥ ν(λ) where Π
is the conjugate of N . Under this view, the language of MEL can serve as an elementary epistemic logic without nested 
modalities and without non-modal formulas from L. Indeed, the following KD axioms and inference rule are valid under 
this understanding [28]:
• All axioms of propositional logics for L✷-formulas.
• (K ): ✷(p → q) → (✷p →✷q).
• (N): ✷p whenever p is a propositional tautology.
• (D): ✷p →✸p.
• Modus Ponens: If φ, φ→ψ then ψ .
Axiom (C): ✷(p ∧ q) ≡ (✷p ∧✷q), which is the adjunction axiom (the Boolean form of the minitivity axiom) is valid in this 
system. In fact, MEL is a (higher-order) propositional logic.
A model for this modal logic is a nonempty subset E ⊆ S (of propositional models). The set E is understood as an 
epistemic state (a meta-model), i.e., the information possessed by an agent that only knows that the real world lies in E . It 
is not empty due to axiom D, which means the agent has a consistent epistemic state. The satisfaction of MEL-formulae is 
then defined recursively:
• E |H✷p, if and only if E ⊆ [p],
• E |H ¬φ, if and only if E 6|H φ,
• E |H φ ∧ψ , if and only if E |H φ and E |Hψ , where φ, ψ are any L✷-formulae,
• So, E |H✸p if and only if E ∩ [p] 6= ∅.
For any set Γ ∪ {φ} of L✷-formulae, φ is a semantic consequence of Γ , written Γ |H φ, provided that, for every epistemic 
state E, E |H Γ implies E |H φ.
This Boolean possibilistic logic, equipped with modus ponens, (the L✷-fragment of KD) is sound and complete w.r.t. this 
semantics [3]. In particular, it does not require the use of accessibility relations.
6.2. The logic of Boolean capacities
This construction can be extended to qualitative capacities using the same language. Interpret now |H✷p as standing for 
γ ([p]) ≥ λ > 0 for any qualitative capacity γ and an arbitrary such threshold λ, or equivalently γλ([p]) = 1, using cuts. The 
following axioms are then verified [12]:
• All axioms of propositional logics for L✷-formulas.
(RM): ✷p →✷q, whenever ⊢ p → q.
(N): ✷⊤.
(P ): ✸⊤.
• Modus Ponens: If φ, φ→ψ then ψ .
This system seems to be the natural logical account of qualitative capacities: RM expresses the monotonicity of capacities, 
and the two other axioms stand for γ (S) = 1, γ (∅) = 0 respectively.
This modal logic we call QC is a known monotonic (non-regular) modal logic. It is a special case of the monotonic modal
logic EMN (Chellas [6]), a fragment where modalities only apply to propositions, not to modal formulas. This logic no longer 
satisfies axioms K, C nor D.
A QC-model for this modal logic is a Boolean capacity β and the satisfaction of QC-formulae is then defined recursively 
as in MEL, replacing E by β:
• β |H✷p, if and only if β([p]) = 1;
• E |H ¬φ, E |H φ ∧ψ in the standard way, as above.
Semantic entailment is defined as in the previous subsection, and syntactic entailment is classical propositional entail-
ment taking RM, N, P as axioms: Γ ⊢Q C φ if and only if Γ ∪ {all instances of RM, N, P } ⊢ φ (classically defined).
Proposition 21. The logic QC is sound and complete with respect to the semantics in terms of qualitative capacities.
Proof. It goes along the same lines as the soundness and completeness of the MEL logic [3]. As QC is a propositional 
logic, all we have to do is to show that there is a one-to-one correspondence between standard propositional models of 
QC (assignments t : L✷→{0, 1}) and Boolean capacities. To see it, note that if we let tβ (✷p) = 1 if and only if β([p]) = 1, 
we do define a standard propositional valuation that obeys RM, N, P. Conversely given a standard propositional valuation t
that obeys RM, N, P, we immediately see that the set-function βt defined by βt([p]) = 1 if and only if t(✷p) = 1 defines a 
qualitative capacity, since
• from RM, βt([p]) = 1 and p |H q implies βt([q]) = 1,
• from N, βt([⊤]) = βt(S) = 1
• from P, βt([⊥]) = t(✷⊥) = 1 − t(✸⊤) = 0.
So QC is sound and complete with respect to qualitative capacities, just because as for any knowledge base in propositional 
logic, syntactic inference is equivalent to semantic entailment. ✷
The usual semantics of such kinds of logics in the general case, also called Scott–Montague semantics, is based on 
so-called neighborhood frames [6]. A neighborhood is a family of non-empty subsets N of 2S and a neighborhood frame is 
an application from S to 2S . Here we do not nest modalities and stick to neighborhoods.
The neighborhood semantics takes the following form:
N |H✷p if and only if [p] ∈N ;
N |H✸p if and only if [¬p] /∈N .
The following properties are easy to see:
• Axiom RM holds if and only if whenever A ∈N , and A ⊆ B , B ∈N as well (closure under inclusion).
• Axiom N means S ∈N (non-triviality) and axiom P means ∅ /∈N (consistency).
We shall call a nontrivial consistent neighborhood that is closed under inclusion a standard neighborhood. It is then easy to 
see that
Proposition 22. The family of sets {A : γλ(A) = 1} is a standard neighborhood and for any standard neighborhood N , the Boolean 
set-function β , defined by β(A) = 1 if and only if A ∈N , is a qualitative capacity.
Besides, since γ =maxni=1 Ni for some number n of necessity measures, denoting by ✷i p the statement Ni([p]) ≥ λ > 0, 
it is clear that γ ([p]) ≥ λ > 0 stands for ✷p ≡
∨n
i=1✷i p, where ✷i is the KD modality induced by a focal set E i of Ni . By 
duality, ✸p =¬✷¬p =
∧n
i=1✸i p.
The semantics of the QC logic in terms of Boolean capacities β can be thus equivalently expressed in terms of non-empty 
subsets of S (i.e. focal sets of β) as follows:
β |H✷p ⇐⇒ ∃E i ∈F(β), E i |H✷i p.
Interestingly, we can put an upper bound on the number of KD modalities that define ✷ by adding the n-adjunction 
axiom to the axioms of QC (see [12] for n = 2):
Cn:
(
n+1∧
i=1
✷pi
)
→
n+1∨
i 6= j=1
✷(pi ∧ p j),
for some fixed positive integer n. In QC, it implies that if pi , i = 1, . . . , n + 1 are mutually inconsistent, then ⊢ ¬ 
∧n+1
i=1 ✷pi . 
This property claims that we cannot have γ ([pi ]) ≥ λ > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n + 1. When n = 1, we recover axiom C (adjunc-
tion) and the MEL setting. The models of this restricted QC logic with axiom Cn are n-adjunctive Boolean capacities. The 
satisfaction relation in this restricted logic can be expressed using n-tuples of non-empty subsets of S as follows:
(E1, . . . , En) |H✷p if ∃i ∈ [1,n], E i |H✷i p.
By construction, an n-adjunctive Boolean capacity has n focal sets E1, . . . , En that can refer to a society of n agents. As in 
the case of a KD modality, where a non-empty set E of interpretations stands for the epistemic state E of a single agent, 
one can assume that an n-adjunctive Boolean capacity stands for the joint epistemic states (E1, . . . , En) of several agents, 
whereby the truth of ✷p means that p is true for at least one agent i. Note that such agents hold globally non-redundant 
epistemic states E i , since these sets are focal sets of a Boolean capacity and thus form an antichain for inclusion: as there 
is no inclusion between the E i ’s, there are beliefs each agent possesses that are held by none of the other agents.
This capacity-based semantics corresponds to neighborhoods of the form N = {A : ∃i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n, E i ⊆ A}. In particular,
• For the KD-logic MEL, it is obvious that N = {A : N(A) ≥ λ} = {A : A ⊇ E} for some non-empty E ⊆ S (N is a proper 
filter).
• For the QC logic, N = {A : γ (A) ≥ λ > 0} 6= 2S is closed under inclusion and not empty.
• For QC logic with Cn , N = {A : γ (A) ≥ λ > 0} is the union of n proper filters of the form {A : Ni(A) ≥ λ} = {A : A ⊇ E i}.
Then we shall have again soundness and completeness of the QC logic with axiom Cn with respect to n-adjunctive Boolean 
capacities, since classical models of QC are accordingly constrained by axiom Cn: t((
∧n+1
i=1 ✷pi) →
∨n+1
i 6= j=1✷(pi ∧ p j)) = 1 if 
and only if βt is n-adjunctive.
Remark 9. The QC logic framework comes close to Belnap logic [5] as pointed out in [12], namely we have several sources 
(here, with respective epistemic states E1, E2, . . . , En), each of which asserting, denying each formula or being silent about it. 
A formula is then considered true if at least one source asserts it and none denies it, which does correspond to a disjunction 
of KD modalities. In Belnap logic, these formulas are only literals, the epistemic status of other formulas being computed 
via a truth-table. See also [7] for the case when the sets (E1, . . . , En) are singletons and its connection to three-valued 
paraconsistent logics.
7. Conclusion
We have studied the representation of capacities having values on a finite totally ordered scale by families of qualitative 
possibility distributions. It turns out that any capacity can be viewed either as a lower possibility measure or as an upper 
necessity measure with respect to two distinct families of possibility distributions. This remark has led to propose a gener-
alization of maxitivity and minitivity properties of possibility theory, thus offering a classification of qualitative capacities in 
terms of increasing levels of complexity and generality, based on the minimal number of possibility distributions needed to 
represent them. A connection between the size of focal sets of a capacity and the number of focal sets of its conjugate has 
been laid bare. Finally, we have shown that the corresponding property of n-adjunction enables qualitative capacities and 
non-regular modal logics to be connected, which generalizes KD-style modal logic in the same sense as capacities generalize 
necessity measures. This suggests a potential application to reasoning with conflicting sources of information.
It is clear that our results also apply to numerical capacities with a finite range, or defined on a finite set, as they are a 
special case of our setting, which does not use addition. The extension of our results to qualitative capacities on an infinite 
set, ranging on an ordinal scale, would deserve a specific investigation. Similarly it could be interesting to generalize the 
presented results to capacities ranging on a lattice [33].
Numerous open alleys of research are opened by the above results. We can mention three of them:
• On the logical side, we may reconsider the study of non-regular modal logics in the light of capacity-based semantics. 
It looks like a general setting for reasoning about uncertainty due both to incomplete and conflicting information. The 
fact that it comes down to disjunctions of KD necessity operators is clearly pointing towards Belnap epistemic set-ups 
[12], and paraconsistent logics [7].
• One may also wish to evaluate the quantity of information (or uncertainty) contained in a qualitative capacity. This is 
done in the numerical case by Marichal and Roubens [30]. Some preliminary results in the qualitative setting appear in 
[22], based on an information ordering reminiscent of a qualitative counterpart of the specialization of belief functions 
(inclusion of focal sets) introduced in [32].
• The multi-source interpretation of qualitative capacities could be instrumental for the study of advanced methods for 
information fusion, especially qualitative counterparts to Dempster rule of combination [32,1].
Appendix A. Decomposition of qualitative capacities in terms of Boolean capacities
Let γλ denote the Boolean capacity obtained as γλ(A) = 1 if γ (A) ≥ λ, and 0 otherwise, and we call it its λ-cut. Obviously, 
the focal sets of γ are among those of its λ-cut: F(γ ) ⊆
⋃
λ∈L F(γλ). The following is the counterpart, for capacities, of the 
decomposition of a fuzzy set in terms of its cuts.
Proposition 23. Each qualitative capacity can be decomposed as follows: γ =maxλ∈L min(λ, γλ).
Proof. For all λ ∈ L, min(λ, γλ(A)) = λ if γ (A) ≥ λ and 0 otherwise. So for all λ ∈ L, min(λ, γλ(A)) ≤ γ (A) i.e., 
maxλ∈L min(λ, γλ(A)) ≤ γ (A).
Conversely, γ (A) =min(γ (A), γγ (A)(A)) ≤maxλ∈L min(λ, γλ(A)). ✷
Moreover the focal sets of γ are the ones of its cuts.
Proposition 24. F(γ ) =
⋃
λ∈L F(γλ).
Proof. Let A be a focal set of γ . γγ (A)(A) = 1 and ∀B ⊂ A we have γγ (A)(B) = 0 since γ (B) < γ (A). So A is a focal set of 
γγ (A) and A ∈
⋃
λ∈L F(γλ).
Let A ∈
⋃
λ∈L F(γλ). Hence there exists λ such that γλ(A) = 1 and ∀B ⊂ A, γλ(B) = 0. We have γ (A) ≥ λ and ∀B ⊂ A, 
γ (B) < λ so ∀B ⊂ A, γ (B) < γ (A) i.e., A ∈F(γ ). ✷
The decomposition process is valid as well for the inner qualitative Möbius transform:
Proposition 25. γ# =maxλ∈L min(λ, γ
λ
# ).
Proof. According to Proposition 24, γ#(A) = 0 if and only if for all λ we have γ
λ
# (A) = 0.
If γ#(A) 6= 0 then γ#(A) = min(γ#(A), γ
γ#(A)
# (A)) ≤ maxλ∈L min(λ, γ
λ
# (A)). Consider λ ∈ L, if λ > γ#(A) then
min(λ, γ λ# (A)) = 0 and if λ < γ#(A) then min(λ, γ
λ
# (A)) ≤ λ < γ#(A). So we have maxλ∈L min(λ, γ
λ
# (A)) ≤ γ#(A). ✷
Corollary 3. γ#(E) =maxλ:E∈F(γλ) λ.
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